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Executive Summary 
 
 
An external evaluation was carried out in July-August 2003 to assess 
the results and the implementation process of the first 15 months of 
IMD’s programme in Guatemala. The central objective of this 
programme is to strengthen political parties and the party system in a 
sustainable way. Several unfavourable conditions limit the realisation of 
this ambition: (i) the political party system in Guatemala has been 
unstable, fragmented, polarised and discredited, (ii) political parties 
were often not more than electoral machines, lacking a programmatic 
and ideological base, and generally figured among the weakest actors in 
society, (iii) political participation by citizens has been very low, 
especially among the indigenous majority of the population. 
 
Against this background, since March 2002 IMD developed in a joint 
venture with UNDP an ambitious project for a multiparty dialogue 
process, trying to generate consensus on a shared National Agenda that 
reflects the basic principles of the Peace Agreements. The basic idea 
was that collaboration and dialogue among the parties is a prerequisite 
for future democratic stability, as none of the individual parties is able 
to sustain such a national project. Moreover, the national Congress 
does not function as a forum for dialogue given the polarized political 
climate in the country. 
 
The initial result of the Dialogue programme was that a group of 40 
politicians from all political parties was engaged in a year-long process 
of building mutual confidence and constructing an agenda for the 
future of the country. Indirectly, this Dialogue group stimulated the 
establishment of a Forum on Political Parties (previously not existing) 
in which all party leaders committed themselves to implement the 
agreements laid down in the Peace Agreements. The Dialogue was 
affected in the last phase by the polarisation around Rios Montt’s 
candidacy and by the start of the election campaign, thereby frustrating 
the smooth incorporation of the National Agenda into the 
programmes of the parties. 
 
The importance of the Dialogue process and the positive support role 
of IMD for the UNDP as well as for the OAS programmes is widely 
acknowledged. Given the unfavourable conditions, this was probably 
the most that could have been achieved. A possible follow-up will 
depend on the new political situation generated by the November 2003 
elections. The multiparty approach of IMD is definitely an interesting 
“niche”, although the donor community is currently inflated by similar 
approaches; a future strategy therefore requires careful rethinking. 
 
IMD has also taken risks by supporting this project as the only donor 
with large funding, complemented by a relatively weak bilateral 
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programme that is in need of coherence and a strategic vision. The 
current challenge is to refocus the strategy and to closely coordinate 
with other (particularly Nordic) donors on complementary projects and 
to build on the confidence generated by a small group of politicians 
who potentially represent the seed for a new political culture in the 
country. 
 
A dilemma to be resolved is that a multiparty approach seems to 
contradict support to individual parties, whereas newly created and less 
institutionalised parties require direct support to prevent that their 
ideological position will fade away in broader coalitions. These new 
parties prefer to be part of a colourful fruit salad, rather than being 
diluted into a fruit punch. The challenge for IMD is to accompany this 
search for constructing a colourful political spectrum without being 
caught in partisan rivalries. IMD is therefore advised to continue its 
programme in Guatemala, but to rethink and sharpen its focus. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
This document reports on the findings of an external evaluation 
mission to assess the Guatemala country programme of the 
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (IMD). The 
evaluation was initiated by the board of IMD and is part of a first 
round of external evaluations of IMD’s programme. In 2003 these will 
be implemented in Guatemala and Mozambique, countries in which 
IMD operates relatively large programmes with a local representative. 
 
The evaluation was realised by an international team of four experts in 
the field of democracy promotion and political participation: Tom 
Carothers (Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, Washington DC), Mónica Jimenez (Director of Participa, 
Santiago de Chile), Raquel Zelaya (Director of ASIES and former 
member of the Peace Secretariate, Guatemala) and Kees Biekart 
(Fellow, Transnational Institute, Amsterdam). Mónica Jimenez acted as 
the team leader and Kees Biekart was responsible for drafting the 
report, which was discussed and approved by the entire team. 
 
The objectives of the evaluation, according to the Terms of Reference, 
were the following: 
 
• To assess the achieved results of the programme in relation 
with the objectives as specified in the logical framework; 
• To provide an analysis of the current political situation and 
make concrete recommendations, if necessary, to adjust the 
IMD programme or specific projects in Guatemala in order to 
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the programme and 
ensure the best possible use of the available resources; 
• To provide a better understanding of the relationship between 
the used methodology and the effectiveness of the programme. 
This includes the use of the dialogue methodology to enhance 
ownership, administrative procedures, the role of the 
representation and partnerships with other national and 
international organisations; 
• To analyse the IMD/UNDP Project to establish a National 
Agenda and analyse the feasibility of the initiation and 
implementation of a similar Agenda setting exercise in other 
countries; 
• To assess the appropriateness of the monitoring system as 
developed by ASIES.  
 
Apart from these central objectives, the evaluation team was also 
requested to address a number of specific questions related to 
implementation modalities, programme coherence and sustainability: 
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a. Bilateral and cross-party projects: 
 
• What are the achieved results, both qualitative as quantitative, 
in relation to the general and specific objectives of each 
project?  
• Is the assumption correct that the three specific objectives lead 
to the overall objective namely developing and strengthening 
the multi party system? 
• What is the impact of the programme at the institutional 
strengthening of political parties? 
• What is the impact of the programme on the development and 
strengthening of a multiparty system in Guatemala?  
 
b. Implementation modalities: 
 
• Does the methodology as applied guarantee ownership of the 
process by political parties? 
• How does the overall programme management function in 
Guatemala and in the Netherlands? 
• Is the organisational set-up of the permanent representation 
appropriate for the execution of its various functions? 
• Has the cooperation between IMD and other organisations 
been executed successfully and effectively? 
• Has the registration and documentation of the projects been 
adequately organised? 
• What is the added value of the IMD programme in Guatemala, 
compared to other local and international organizations like 
OAS, UNDP, FES working in the same field?  
• Is the programme implemented in a coherent and 
comprehensive way?  
• Are the results of the projects sustainable? 
 
c. Lessons learned: 
 
The evaluation will generate recommendations regarding the following 
issues: 
 
• The need for a continuation of the programme and its possible 
future direction; 
• The effectiveness of the allocation of the budget between the 
different projects; 
• The role of the IMD representation and the main functions it 
should undertake;  
• The impact of the programme as stated in the objectives; 
• The relation between the political party ownership and the 
methodology applied. 
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The evaluation team visited Guatemala between 27 July and 6 August 
2003. Personal interviews and group discussions were organised with a 
few dozen representatives of political parties, IMD-partners, other 
donors and resource persons (see Annex I). Although a large part of 
the interviews took place in the capital, two members of the mission 
(Jimenez and Biekart) also visited the countryside during a four-day 
trip. Documentation was gathered and reviewed, both in the 
Netherlands and in Guatemala (see Annex II). Additional interviews 
were held by Kees Biekart with IMD staff in the Netherlands, before 
and after the field mission. 
 
We would like to thank Doris Cruz, IMD representative in Guatemala, 
for her excellent and supportive role in making the evaluation mission 
a success. We would also like to thank the IMD staff in The Hague and 
all those people in Guatemala that were taking the time to speak to us 
in this crucial period of the country’s democratisation process. 
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2. Guatemala: political context and political 
parties 
 
 
The Guatemala programme of IMD started five years after the signing 
of the Peace Agreements that had formally ended three decades of 
political instability and violence. This chapter provides a brief political 
context analysis for the current evaluation, followed by an analysis of 
the political party system and the challenges facing this system, 
especially after the November 2003 elections. 
 
 
2.1 The political context after the Peace Agreements 
 
Ending Guatemala’s armed conflict took more than ten years of 
negotiations between the URNG and four consecutive governments, 
with a mediating role of the United Nations and a number of paises de 
amigos. The Peace Agreements, signed in December 1996 between the 
URNG and the PAN-led government, were a highlight in Guatemala’s 
history. The Agreements included a detailed list of complex themes 
and measures that were meant to tackle the causes of the civil war: 
political and socio-economic exclusion of the poor and of ethnic 
groups, and political institutions that had been dominated by a small 
and powerful elite. The implementation of the Agreements was 
therefore a major challenge, requiring genuine political will from state 
institutions as well as from civil society groups. 
 
Almost seven years later and a few months before the November 2003 
elections the implementation process has at least achieved the 
elimination of institutionalised political repression, which has led to an 
improvement of the human rights situation. There are now guarantees 
for political participation of all ideological tendencies and better 
conditions for social organisation of new groups in civil society. 
Moreover, all political parties have accepted the need for increased 
political participation by indigenous people, women and youth. Finally, 
a joint commitment by all social, political and economic forces has 
been made to reform the tax system by way of a Fiscal Pact.  
 
However, it is also clear that the Peace Agreements have not (yet) 
contributed to a structural transformation of a divided Guatemalan 
society and of (inefficient and corrupt) state institutions. This 
transformation is still incomplete on many fronts, especially when it 
concerns a reform of the security services. As a result, Guatemalan 
citizens still feel the agreements have not considerably led to a 
noticeable improvement of their situation. Social and political 
exclusion of large parts of the (indigenous) population – one of the 
main causes of the civil war – is still persisting and perceptions of 
insecurity and fear are still present, particularly in rural areas. The 
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future government and the new Congress are expected to come up 
with concrete measures to deal with these problems after the election 
year, a year in which the United Nations mission MINUGUA – which 
verified the implementation of the Agreements – gradually withdrew 
from the country. 
 
 
2.2 The political party system 
 
Guatemala’s political party system is weak and unstable. Political 
parties function as electoral machines for individual candidates, rather 
than as programmatic political organisations that develop over a longer 
period of time. Remarkably, only one political party – the Christian 
Democratic PDC – has a substantial history (40 years) and more or less 
an explicit ideology. The two main parties (FRG and PAN) only exist 
for about twelve years, whereas the majority of parties often have a 
short life after they have been defeated in the elections. 
 
Guatemalan political life is currently dominated by these two political 
forces, neither of which is best thought of in terms of a political party. 
One is the Republican Guatemalan Front (FRG), which is a populist 
movement centered around retired General Rios Montt, a  former 
coup leader and currently the President of the National Congress. 
Since 1991 Rios Montt has tried to run for president, but until recently 
this was prevented by the Constitution. The FRG has a core of 
disciplined Montt followers but it appears to have assembled according 
to some observers a collection of persons that seek power for 
opportunistic reasons during its last four years in government. The 
FRG is ideologically mixed, fusing elements of right-wing nationalism 
with leftist social populism. 
 
The other major political force is the Party for National Progress 
(PAN), representing the oligarchic economic class that dominated 
Guatemalan life for most of the 20th century, often equated with the 
members of the employers’ association CACIF. The oligarchic interests 
acted through the PAN for most of the 1990s but the PAN is more of 
a political vehicle for this class than a true party. This year an internal 
battle within the PAN led to the splitting off of its expected 
presidential candidate, Oscar Berger, who will now be running as the 
candidate of GANA, an alliance of three small parties. The PAN is 
greatly weakened by this split, as it is expected that the oligarchy’s 
money and influence will largely be put behind GANA. 
 
The other approximately twenty political parties are an assortment of 
small political groups, most of them basically narrow leadership 
vehicles operating out of the capital with little institutional structure 
and social base. Only a couple of these parties (including the URNG) 
seem to be based on a broader political movement. The majority of 
these parties will likely not gain representation in the Congress during 
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the next elections and will either close down or fade into dormancy 
until the next election. 
 
Most parties have a vertical and undemocratic structure in which the 
(male) presidential candidate and the party leader are the central 
figures. Their opinion constitutes the programme of the party, rather 
than a programme based on a jointly developed ideology. Parties 
receive a minor financial contribution from the state (about 25 
eurocent for every vote), which is insufficient to finance the electoral 
campaigns and the organisational structure. Therefore, private 
(business) funding dominates to finance expensive media-based 
campaigns to promote personalities, rather than proposals based on 
ideologies. This ‘privatised’ political system generates populist 
candidates, promising spectacular political changes in any direction that 
aim to trigger the imagination and the hope of the population. 
 
Obviously, this generates disillusion after it becomes clear that 
promises about fundamental changes – such as socio-economic 
improvements and guarantees for physical security – are not realised. 
Charges of corruption by elected politicians are therefore a returning 
issue, leading to a wide-spread perception of betrayal among the 
population after the elections. This in turn reinforces low voter turn-
out, which is already among the lowest in the entire continent. The 
mass media play a problematic role in this process, as these are 
dominated by corporate interests and generally lack any editorial 
independence. 
 
The disillusion among the population about the virtues of the political 
system has led to a crisis of legitimacy of the parties. Surveys have 
indicated that the majority of citizens have a very negative opinion 
about political parties, despite the fact that most people recognise that 
these constitute key instruments in a representative democracy. The 
parties will therefore have to be democratised, in which leaders and 
candidates are elected by their membership, instead of being appointed 
by a small elite. It is also required that parties engage in a more 
permanent presence in society instead of only being activated during 
electoral campaigns. 
 
These fundamental changes in the political system are only possible if 
political parties are jointly agreeing on structural changes, such as a 
reform of the Law on Political Parties that will be discussed in the next 
Congress. This reform basically aims to strengthen internal democracy 
of parties, regulate their funding, and improve the system of voter 
registration. Signs for a future consensus on these issues are present in 
newly established discussion platforms, such as the Forum on Political 
Parties, the Interparty Dialogue that works on a ‘Shared National 
Agenda’ and the Democratic Front for Democracy, an alliance of 
parties, social movements, academic institutions, NGOs and human 
rights groups. Actually, there seems to be no lack of national agendas, 
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but the question is whether these will be translated into legislation that 
will alter political practice. 
 
An encouraging element is the role of the international donor 
community in relation to political parties. Previously, their focus was 
mainly on supporting non-governmental organisations and 
strengthening government institutions. In recent years a range of new 
programmes is targeting the weak political system by facilitating 
dialogue between political party representatives, offering a range of 
training courses for politicians and by supporting campaigns that 
stimulate political participation of marginalised sectors of the 
population. 
 
2.3 Challenges faced by the political parties 
 
In August 2003 a total of 22 parties were registered with the Supreme 
Electoral Tribunal (TSE). Of these parties only nine presidential 
candidates are still in the race, after the withdrawal of Bueso (Christian 
Democrats), Paiz (Democratic Union) and the only indigena candidate 
Quemé (representing a coalition of CASA, Transparency and ANN). 
The latest opinion poll indicated that Oscar Berger (GANA) is leading, 
followed by Alvaro Colom (UNE), Efrain Rios Montt (FRG) and 
Leonel López (PAN).1 If none of the presidential candidates gets a 
majority vote, which is very likely, a second election round between the 
top two candidates in late December will decide about the new 
president. A new Congress, which will be expanded from 113 to 158 
candidates, will also be elected. It is expected that about six parties will 
manage to get one or more representatives in Congress.  
 
As it is unlikely that any party will get a majority, a minimal consensus 
will have to be negotiated between the parties to guarantee the 
implementation of new legislation responding to joint agreements that 
were reached between the parties in previous months, such as the 
Shared National Agenda and the Agreement to fully implement the 
remaining elements of the Peace Agreements. Major political debate is 
expected to be generated on the issue of constitutional reform which 
aims to democratise key institutions such as the Supreme Electoral 
Tribunal, the Constitutional Court and the National Accounts Office. 
The legitimacy of these institutions has been questioned at times 
during the present government, especially in relation to the presidential 
candidacy of ex-general Ríos Montt. 
 
Another key piece of legislation is the Fiscal Pact, requiring an 
agreement on a number of sensitive issues related to existing privileges 
and tax exemptions. The implementation of a new fiscal policy is 
important to finance the budget for health, education, public security, 
 
1 The poll was published on 9 September 2003 by the largest daily paper ‘Prensa Libre’. 
However, these polls are often manipulated and unreliable; therefore no percentages are 
given. 
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justice and poverty alleviation, which are issues that have raised high 
expectations among the population. In addition, the implementation of 
the adopted laws on the system of Local Development Councils, the 
Municipal Code and the law on Decentralisation are going to be 
important steps in expanding relationships between local governments 
and civil society. Essentially, these laws will generate new opportunities 
for citizens to influence public policies and to define the social budget, 
which have been important promises in the electoral campaigns. 
 
In order to realise all these measures, political parties (and in particular 
their representatives in Congress) will greatly benefit from the 
necessary funding and high-quality technical assistance, preferably for a 
large part from national sources, as they lack the fundamental 
legislative experience. Exchanges with legislators from other countries 
and the use of ‘best practices’ from abroad can be helpful to increase 
the quality of the Guatemalan legislative process. The parties will also 
have to improve their capacity to reflect on their own weaknesses, 
given the fact that their membership is rather small (5 % of the 
electorate) and their legitimacy is questioned. 
 
In January 2003 the United States criticised the Guatemalan 
government for being too soft on combating drugs trafficking and that 
this was tolerated by high-ranking government officials. The US is 
threatening to exclude Guatemala from becoming part of the new Free 
Trade Agreement of the Americas, which is currently being negotiated; 
this could have serious implications for the national economy. This US 
sanction threat is a substantial proof of earlier allegations that networks 
of drugs trade and organised crime, which are part of a ‘parallel power’, 
have penetrated high-level political sectors in Guatemala. The creation 
of a commission to deal with this problem of organised crime impunity 
(CICIACS) has been agreed upon by all political parties, but will still 
have to be appointed in early 2004. Moreover, it will have to be 
monitored by the parties to guarantee a successful implementation, also 
to prevent Guatemala’s exclusion from the free trade agreement. 
 
The challenges facing the political parties, and the political system in 
general, are therefore considerable. The parties in Congress will have to 
show the capacity to negotiate and to find a consensus which can 
create conditions for democratic governance in the years to come. 
Whoever will win the November 2003 elections, it is clear that the new 
government is going to have a very difficult task in dealing with all the 
issues mentioned above if it is not receiving the full support from 
opposition parties in the realisation of the minimal agenda that has 
been agreed upon in recent months. On the other hand, the future 
government, whatever political colour it may have, also will have to 
commit itself to this minimal national agenda to prevent the current 
process of democratic consolidation from breaking down, with all the 
dramatic consequences attached. 
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3. IMD’s programme in Guatemala 
 
 
The Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (IMD), founded 
in 2000 by the Dutch political parties, aims to support the process of 
democratisation in ‘young democracies’. Its particular mission is to 
strengthen political parties and to contribute to the creation of well-
functioning, sustainable and pluralistic political party systems. IMD has 
gradually developed over a dozen country programmes in Asia, Africa 
and Latin America. In Latin America, IMD runs programmes in 
Suriname, Bolivia and Guatemala. The Guatemala programme 
officially started in March 2002. Before outlining the content of the 
programme, an overview will be given of its origin. 
 
 
3.1 History of the Guatemala programme 
 
From the very start of IMD’s activities, Guatemala was listed as a 
possible programme country for several reasons: 
• The signing of the peace accords in 1996, bringing an end to 
three decades of civil war, provided new opportunities for a 
process of democratisation; 
• Socio-economic inequality and marginalisation of the majority 
of the (Indian) population provided new challenges for an 
inclusive approach to politics; 
• The weak system of political parties was in need of external 
support, other than the traditional funding from the oligarchy; 
• The emergence of new opposition parties and their insertion 
into a multiparty system based on ideological (rather than 
personalistic) characteristics; 
• The upcoming elections in November 2003 provided 
opportunities for a two-year pre-electoral programme of 
political party strengthening. 
 
IMD completed two preparatory missions before starting up the 
programme in March 2002. The first identification mission was realised 
by Alvaro Pinto, IMD Board member and International Secretary of 
the Dutch Labour Party (PvdA), in July 2001.2 His main conclusion 
was that support to political parties in Guatemala was of key 
importance for the political future of the country, especially with the 
upcoming elections of 2003. The main challenge was to implement the 
agreements laid down in the Peace Accords, in particular the national 
agenda. The weak political party system was undermining this agenda 
as parties were acting merely as autocratic electoral machines for one 
candidate, rather than democratic organisations with their proper 
 
2 See ‘Report Guatemala visit 2-11 July and New York 12-13 July 2001’ by Alvaro Pinto 
Scholtbach (in Dutch). 
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programmes. Therefore, the challenge was to strengthen party 
structures in the longer run, including their electoral programmes, with 
the elections of 2003 serving as a first target. Another conclusion was 
that civilian committees (comités cívicos) and other social groups 
played an important role as alternative channels for political 
participation, and that support to these groups indirectly also would 
strengthen the political party system. 
 
Pinto suggested several recommendations to IMD. The first one was 
to avoid direct financial support to political parties (as was done in 
Mozambique) given their current weakness. Instead it was proposed to 
initiate a programme consisting of three complementary elements: (i) a 
multiparty support programme aimed at strengthening dialogue and the 
elaboration of a joint national agenda; (ii) technical support 
programmes at the local level for political-civilian groups (such as 
‘comités civicos’ or ‘mesas de concertación’); (iii) technical assistance to 
political parties through training programmes and seminars by party 
experts from the Netherlands.  
 
Initial contacts were made with the Dutch Embassy, UNDP, OAS, 
IDEA and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, who were all in some way 
involved in these programmes. From these contacts the idea emerged 
to develop a dialogue programme on the National Agenda together 
with UNDP, possibly as a joint IMD-UNDP project. Another option 
was to participate in the OAS-supported programme for strengthening 
political parties, a programme also financed by the Dutch Embassy. In 
terms of monitoring and evaluation, UNDP proposed to take care of 
the entire IMD programme, with the exception of a possible IMD-
OAS component. An estimated 1,2 million Dutch guilders (EUR 
545.000) a year was mentioned to be necessary to finance the new 
programme (although a detailed budget could not be found in the 
archives). 
 
A second and broader IMD mission to detail the agreements with the 
organisations involved visited Guatemala in February 2002.3 Apart 
from a programme to establish and extend contacts for IMD, the 
delegation discussed the proposed joint venture with UNDP. 
However, the Dutch Embassy strongly advised IMD not to work 
exclusively with UNDP and suggested also to support part of the OAS 
programme on ‘Democratic values’, which was financed by the Dutch 
government and several Nordic governments. In a joint meeting with 
these donors, facilitated by the Dutch Embassy, it was agreed that 
IMD would try to integrate and complement elements of both the 
UNDP and the OAS programmes in order to guarantee the most 
 
3 The second mission visited Guatemala between 3 and 10 February 2002, after a planned 
visit in November 2001 was postponed. Members included: Jos van Gennip (Christian 
Democratic party), Sam Pormes (Green Left party), Alvaro Pinto (Labour party and 
delegation leader) and Ellen van Koppen (Labour party). See ‘Report IMD-mission 
Guatemala 3-10 February 2002’ (in Dutch). 
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effective outcome. A tripartite council would be established by IMD to 
coordinate the implementation of the various initiatives and to 
facilitate collaboration between IMD, UNDP and OAS. The content 
of these programmes will be further detailed below.  
 
The second preparatory mission also identified the need for additional 
so-called ‘bilateral projects’ between IMD and political parties and/or 
organisations representing civil society. This bilateral programme 
would focus particularly on exchanges between Dutch and Guatemalan 
political parties and on technical assistance for particular needs 
identified by the Guatemalan parties. Given the focus on the national 
level of the UNDP-IMD programme, a preference was given to 
support at the local level. One option was to train members of comités 
civicos, although a disadvantage is that these local committees have to 
be dissolved after the elections. Another suggestion was to work out 
projects for supporting individual political parties directly. A concrete 
proposal was not offered by the delegation, other then urging a close 
coordination with the UNDP-administered ‘cross-party’ programme. 
 
The mission also proposed to appoint a former UNDP-employee, the 
Programme officer of the Peace Process programme Doris Cruz, as a 
country representative of IMD in Guatemala, starting in March 2002. 
She was closely involved in IMD's preparations for the new country 
programme and her task would be to represent IMD locally and 
develop and implement the IMD programme in Guatemala. 
 
 
3.2 The Dialogue programme: a joint venture between UNDP 
and IMD 
 
The UNDP project ‘Multiparty Party Dialogue’ is currently the core of 
IMD’s programme in Guatemala. The full title is “Political 
Strengthening through Electoral Program Development”, but will be 
further referred to as the “Dialogue Programme”. It is a two-year 
programme (April 2002 - April 2004) with the central objective to 
support Guatemalan political parties in creating a Shared National 
Agenda which articulates the National Peace Agreements of 1996. The 
immediate aim is to enhance the capacity of these parties to build 
electoral programmes in the light of the November 2003 elections, 
based on constructing a National Agenda by means of a multiparty 
dialogue and accompanied by UNDP and IMD. 
 
Although the programme was designed to provide support to the 
Guatemalan political parties to more effectively participate in the 
November 2003 elections and to generate more coherent electoral 
programmes based on ideological principles and a national agenda, in 
the long run it also aims to strengthen the political party system. That 
is, beyond these elections.  
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Four phases were identified in the programme proposal: 
 
• In the first phase, the political parties work together to identify 
their needs in relation to the priorities of a national agenda and 
to develop a shared work plan; 
• The second phase will then work out this national agenda by 
using a multiparty dialogue in which the peace agreements and 
the socio-economic situation are used as key references; 
• The third phase focuses on providing support to individual 
parties, helping them to generate dialogue and analysis within 
their party structures leading to the development of their own 
electoral programmes; 
• Finally, in the fourth phase the programme assists the parties to 
translate their electoral programmes (based on the shared 
national agenda) into either a government or an opposition 
agenda. 
 
During the programme implementation direct exchanges between 
Guatemalan and Dutch (and other foreign) political parties are 
organised to provide input to this process of electoral programme 
development. IMD considers this as a unique opportunity for 
Guatemalan political actors to acquire first-hand experience from other 
(consolidated and democratic) multiparty political systems. This 
bilateral element of the programme includes exchanges of experiences 
and technical information as well as training courses for specific issues 
related to the Shared National Agenda. 
 
The programme is open to all political parties that are legally registered 
(16 parties at the start of the programme, gradually extended to 22 
parties). Each party appoints two representatives that will participate in 
the identification of the main themes and in the subsequent dialogue 
process. An intensive scheme of about 40 workshops is planned in 
which the dialogue methodology developed by UNDP is implemented. 
This methodology originated in the MIT Organisational Learning 
Center and was previously used in other countries for democratic 
dialogue between civil actors, but in Guatemala for the first time also 
applied to political parties. It is foreseen that UNDP will start a 
regional project on the basis of the Guatemalan experience. 
 
The entire programme has a budget of USD 446.436 for two years, of 
which 95 % per cent will be provided by IMD and 5 % by UNDP. The 
programme is run and administered by UNDP, with close 
collaboration with and consultation of IMD via a management 
committee composed of representatives from both organisations. This 
committee appoints the programme manager. Another committee 
composed of representatives from the OAS, IMD and UNPD will be 
established to coordinate activities of both programmes and to avoid 
duplication of efforts. Finally, an Advisory Board of local experts will 
be set up to provide advice to the UNDP-IMD programme 
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throughout the implementation phase, especially on the bilateral 
projects.  
 
At the end of the first year an external evaluation is foreseen to assess 
the achievements of the programme and judge whether possible 
adjustments are necessary. In addition, the local research institute 
ASIES was requested in the Spring of 2003 to develop an evaluation 
model (based on a logical framework analysis) in order to monitor and 
evaluate the UNDP-IMD project. 
 
 
3.3 Democratic values: the OAS programme 
 
The other large multilateral programme aimed at strengthening political 
parties in which IMD participates is the ‘Democratic values and 
political management programme’ run by the Democracy Promotion 
Unit of the OAS. Other than the UNDP programme, the OAS 
programme in Guatemala is part of a regional project which is also 
supported by a number of other donors, among them the governments 
of Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands. The programme is a 
follow-up to a project that started in 1998, in with a range of 
workshops and courses were convened to train local political leaders, 
and later also to stimulate the incorporation of women and youth into 
the constituencies of the parties. 
 
Based on these experiences the ‘Democratic Values’ programme was 
developed in 2002. The central objective is to promote and develop 
democratic values and practices in Guatemala by way of strengthening 
the political party system. 
 
The four specific goals are: 
 
• Contribute to improving political practice and management in 
the public sphere by training political leaders and elected 
representatives in democratic values and political management; 
• Contribute to developing a political culture of dialogue among 
political organisations and between these organisations and the 
government by creating spaces for discussion and analysis; 
• Create conditions for increasing political participation (both in 
terms of quality as well as quantity) of representatives from the 
Indigenous peoples, women and youth; 
• Promote the creation of capacities at the local level within the 
parties in order to contribute to their institutional strength. 
 
Five clusters of activities are designed to put these objectives into 
practice. The first is to discuss and analyse ‘best practices’ of 
institutional strengthening of parties which can contribute to improve a 
range of current weaknesses. At the level of the internal party 
structures this refers to internal elections, party finances, political 
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organisation, conflict resolution, administration and the development 
party programmes and proper ideologies. At the level of the entire 
party system the activities are geared towards improving the electoral 
system, developing systems to finance campaigns and promoting a 
democratic culture. Exchanges with party members from other 
countries forms part of this cluster. 
 
A second set of activities is oriented at political education and training 
of leaders on democratic values and management of the parties. This 
part of the programme is basically meant for intermediate political 
leaders from all departments, prioritising women, youth and 
representatives from indigenous peoples. Linked to the training 
courses is a certificate for ‘new political leadership’ awarded by the 
University of San Carlos and the Central American Institute for 
Political Studies (INCEP). 
 
The third area of activities aims to develop and strengthen interparty 
networks of women, youth and indigenous. These networks are 
formed on the basis of the previously mentioned training courses, so 
that capacities acquired can be put into practice immediately. The 
networks are considered to be a key space for dialogue and discussion 
and as a breeding space for a new political culture. 
 
The fourth activity of the programme wants to strengthen the 
interaction between parties and organisations of civil society, as the link 
between political and civil society is underdeveloped and undermining 
the legitimacy of the parties. For that purpose ‘round tables’ (mesas de 
diálogo) are set up in which political parties in a structural way enter 
into a dialogue on their agendas and concerns about the construction 
of democracy. Four of these round tables will be established: between 
parties and (i) indigene organisations, (ii) women’s organisations, (iii) 
organisations of civil society, and (iv) the mass media. 
 
Finally, the fifth cluster of activities aims to establish forums and 
networks to transfer all the capacities and experiences that are 
developed during the programme into the daily practice of the 
Guatemalan political parties. This is done within the parties themselves 
by strengthening internal training capacity (intraparty networks), but 
also between the various parties (the creation of a political party 
forum) and between parties and civil society. 
 
IMD finances two elements of this large OAS programme: it gave 
partial support to the first cluster on ‘best practices’ (June 2002 – July 
2003) and to the second cluster on political education and training, in 
particular to train leaders of civil committees (July 2002 – December 
2003). The total IMD contribution amounts to USD 43.200. Although 
the OAS programme continues after 2003, IMD has (not yet) made 
any commitments for supporting this programme after the upcoming 
elections. 
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Apart from the Democratic Values programme, IMD also supports 
and actively participates in the Interamerican Forum on Political 
Parties, which was set up by the OAS and the IDB in 2001. In this 
annual forum of Latin American political parties, international political 
foundations and party internationals IMD is represented by its board 
member Alvaro Pinto. 
 
 
3.4 The bilateral projects 
 
Next to the larger support to the multilateral programmes described 
above, IMD also initiated a number of so-called ‘bilateral projects’. The 
central objective of this bilateral programme is to support political 
parties in developing their technical, programmatical and ideological 
capacities needed to use the opportunities offered in the national, 
regional and/or international sphere. In practice this can relate to 
strengthening the organisation, training and education, both for 
individual parties as well as for alliances. 
 
The parties have to apply for support based on project proposals. The 
bilateral projects do not directly provide funding for parties, but only 
offer financial or technical support for particular activities to a 
maximum of USD 30.000. IMD decides whether proposals are eligible 
for support, depending upon their complentarity with the core of the 
IMD programme (the Multiparty Dialogue) and the exchanges with 
Dutch (or European) political parties. 
 
Between September 2002 and Augustus 2003 the following bilateral 
projects have been supported: 4 
 
• Training of political party cadre organised by MINUGUA on a 
range of newly adopted laws, such as the municipal code, 
decentralisation law and the role of urban and rural 
development councils (First phase in 2002, second phase still 
ongoing; USD 40.000); 
• Direct support for the URNG to facilitate the participation of 
140 of their local members in the Foro Sao Paulo, an 
international political forum convened in the capital (December 
2002; USD 22.841); 
• Direct support for the Partido Unionista to train and prepare 
local leaders for the upcoming elections (January/February 
2002; USD 28.531); 
• Participation of Guatemala in the global network of 
parliamentarians in Greece, especially in relation to the World 
Bank (March 2003; Technical assistance); 
 
4 IMD Guatemala also counts support to the OAS programme as ‘bilateral projects’; this is a 
matter of classification and based on the conviction that the multilateral programme witrh 
UNDP is the core of IMD’s programme. However, this overview does not include the 
projects supported as part of the OAS programme. 
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• Seminar on Ideologies and Programmes in the 21st Century, 
with participation of parties from the Netherlands, Spain, 
Sweden and El Salvador (April 2003; USD 32.478); 
• Forum on indigenous political participation, organised in 
Quetzaltenango (May 2003; USD 16.706); 
• Elaboration of a guide on political organisations in 
Guatemalan, implemented by a researcher of the Francisco 
Marroquin University (Since October 2002; USD 1.558); 
• Co-financing of a Friedrich Ebert-led campaign on 
“Conscientious Voting” (Vote Consciente) at local levels (Until 
August 2003; USD 20.000); 
 
Apart from these eight (nearly) finalised projects, at the moment of 
evaluation about five new projects were still in the stage of approval. 
Among them a follow-up project to the national encounter of 
indigenas, a forum with the Social Pastorate in Alta Verapaz, support 
to a women’s organisation in Alta Verapaz and a pilot project on 
assessing the socio-economic viability of programmes for government.  
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4. Assessment of the results 
 
 
The current evaluation was not meant to do an impact assessment of 
IMD’s Guatemala programme, given the fact that it had only run for 
about 15 months. However, the evaluators were asked to assess initial 
results and to make a mid-term review of the process of the ongoing 
programme. This chapter gives an overview of the results achieved 
with the Dialogue programme with UNDP (the core of the IMD 
programme), the OAS programme and the bilateral projects, followed 
by assessments of these results and an analysis of their sustainability. 
The next chapter analyses issues related to the implementation 
modalities of the programme in more detail. 
 
 
4.1 Results of the Multiparty Dialogue programme 
 
The evaluators were unanimously impressed by the results that have 
been achieved after one year with the multiparty dialogue process, 
although it was also clear that the process had some limitations that 
will be outlined later. But as a starter, it is important to stress that 
UNDP together with IMD has made a correct choice to develop this 
programme as a way to strengthen the Guatemalan political party 
system in the longer run. At two moments self-evaluations were 
produced by UNDP-IMD (April 2003) and by the Dialogue group 
(July 2003) of which the outcomes have been useful for the current 
assessment.5 
 
Overall, UNDP has done excellent work with the multiparty dialogue 
process. The project was well-conceived and well-implemented. The 
UNDP team is dedicated and genuinely enthusiastic about the project 
and has worked hard at all aspect of the process. For UNDP the 
dialogue project was of special importance because it is an extension of 
UNDP’s work on national dialogue processes with other (civil) actors. 
The multiparty dialogue is its first effort in Latin America to stimulate 
and create a meeting and discussion space for political parties, and is 
therefore considered to be a pilot project that will generate important 
lessons for similar projects in other countries. 
 
A project coordinator was contracted in May 2002 (in close 
cooperation with IMD) to prepare the dialogue process. Between June 
and August 2002 the programme was started up with the election of 
two representatives from each political party: one representative from 
the national leadership and one representative from the technical 
 
5 See ‘Internal Report of the Management Committee UNDP-IMD’ (Guatemala, 7 April 
2003); ‘Auto-evaluación representantes políticos, Diálogo Multipartidario’ (Guatemala, 31 
July 2003). 
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department of each party.6 In August 2002 a total of 14 parties had 
presented their representatives; by July 2003 the number of parties had 
grown to 20. Although the group not always had the same 
composition, most of the (on average 40) party representatives 
participated in the entire dialogue programme. Only parties that 
managed to get at least one representative in Congress (4 % of the total 
vote) would be allowed to participate in the follow-up of the dialogue 
programme after the elections, a condition that was meant to stimulate 
coalition-building and reduce the large number of political parties. 
 
After the major themes had been jointly identified by the participants, 
the dialogue programme took off in August 2002 with a series of 
workshops and discussion meetings in order to define a shared national 
agenda. The workshop topics were in fact a combination of the main 
themes of the Peace Agreements and of elements taken from the 
UNDP-sponsored Human Development Report. Between August 
2002 and July 2003 the Dialogue group would convene almost thirty 
times in one or two-day sessions. Local experts were invited to provide 
input to the discussions, followed by internal debates and working 
groups in which the ‘civic dialogue’ method was used draw up 
common positions.7 By analysing key issues from different viewpoints 
and developing a minimal consensus, step by step a culture of dialogue 
was created. 
 
The participants needed some time to get used to the methodology and 
to build some mutual trust in the regular workshops, but gradually a 
framework emerged of a common national agenda.8 The objective of 
the programme was to use this shared national agenda as a basis for 
developing electoral party programmes. From March 2003 onwards, 
the outcomes of the Dialogue group were therefore also transferred to 
the lower ranks of the political parties, for which UNDP facilitated 
workshops for individual parties mostly outside the capital. A total of 
14 of these workshops were convened in which over 500 party cadre 
participated (of which 16 % were women). 
 
Two main obstacles were encountered in the Dialogue process. The 
first was the delayed start of the programme, due to delayed funding 
transfers by the Dutch ministry to IMD in March 2002. As a result the 
project coordinator had to be contracted later than was planned, which 
 
6 Although UNDP and IMD requested to propose a man and a woman, this equal gender 
balance was not realised. 
7 This civil dialogue method has been developed by Generon, Society for Organisational 
Learning and the MIT Organisational Learning Centre and has been applied by UNDP in 
previous years for civil scenario dialogues. It was the first time that UNDP methodology 
coordinator Elena Diez Pinto applied the method also for a dialogue between political 
parties. 
8 The whole dialogue process, including presentations by external experts, the internal 
debates and the concluding sessions, are very well documented by UNDP and all written 
material was submitted to the evaluation team. See ‘Programa de dialogo multipartidario’, 
UNDP-IMD, 2002/2003. 
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in turn delayed the implementation of the dialogue schedule. 
Readjustments of this schedule also implied that the last phase of the 
Dialogue process coincided with the start of the election campaign, in 
which increased competition between the political parties started to 
clash with a proper interparty dialogue. 
 
The second obstacle was a combination of growing political tension in 
the period May to July 2003 (as a product of the disputed Rios Montt 
presidential candidacy) and pressure by the Consultative Group 
(formed by the international donor community) in May 2003 on all 
political parties to commit themselves unconditionally to the Peace 
Agreements. The combination of these external circumstances affected 
a proper finalisation of the Dialogue process, as the agreement and 
presentation of the Shared National Agenda had become a political 
condition by the donor community rather than a tool for future 
stability of the political party system. 
 
As a result of these developments the parties and UNDP-IMD agreed 
to finalise the Dialogue process with a public presentation of the 
Shared National Agenda in mid-September 2003, barely 8 weeks before 
the general elections of 8 November 2003. The originally planned third 
and fourth phases of the Multiparty dialogue – aimed at translating the 
National Agenda into the individual electoral party programmes and to 
transform these programmes into government or opposition agendas – 
had to be either cancelled or seriously reduced. As a result, the last 
phase of the Dialogue process turned out to be rather frustrating for 
the parties as well as for the funders. A proper assessment of the 
impact of this last phase amidst the electoral campaign certainly has to 
be done after the elections. 
 
After one year, the following results have been achieved with the 
dialogue process:  
 
First, one of the most explicit outcomes of the UNDP-IMD Dialogue 
process is that a group of about 40 people representing political parties 
from the entire political spectrum was formed, creating a unique space 
for dialogue, discussion and analysis. Despite political differences the 
members of this group developed a climate of mutual respect, a firm 
commitment to pursue a national agenda based on the Peace 
Agreements and jointly showed that this micro environment can 
become the seed for a new political culture in Guatemala. The fact that 
such a forum did not previously exist in the country and that it showed 
cohesiveness despite a variety of political tensions is a remarkable 
result. 
 
The second achievement is that, although the idea of a multiparty 
dialogue came from outside the country, it met with a strong positive 
response among the participants and seems to have been appropriated 
as their own space. That is, the establishment of a positive, neutral 
space where party representatives can meet to get to know one 
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another, work together, and learn from each other. Given the 
extremely divisive state of Guatemalan politics, this process of bridge-
building is very useful. Representatives of some of the parties have 
used this space to explore possible political alliances among themselves 
(such as GANA) and to resolve political tensions.  
 
A third important result of the dialogue process has been the increased 
political expertise on the part of the participants. The many seminars 
and workshops that they attended were well-organised and rich with 
content. The participants had exposure to many of the best political 
analysts and thinkers in Guatemala and the resultant discussion and 
debates were far-reaching and deep. The impact of this process of 
stimulating a new type of political culture can only be genuinely judged 
over time. However, the likelihood that an estimated one-third of the 
participants of the Dialogue group will be either elected into the new 
Congress or appointed into a future government post illustrates the 
potential of this impact. 
 
Four, elaborating on a shared national agenda which is reflecting an 
unconditional commitment to the implementation of the Peace 
Agreements is a further important result of the dialogue process. It has 
allowed the participants (and indirectly the parties) to work together in 
a process of identifying the policy issues of greatest importance for the 
country and to find common ground between them on these priorities. 
The parties have held a number of meetings at the regional level to 
discuss the agenda and this has contributed to the political education 
of approximately 500 persons within the various parties. It is too early 
to judge whether the items on the agenda will indeed have been 
incorporated into the party programmes.  
 
Five, the establishment of a Political Party Forum in November 2002, 
in which all parties are represented by their secretary generals, can be 
attributed for a large part to the existence of the Dialogue group.9 As 
such, the dialogue process has also usefully complemented the Political 
Party Forum that is supported by the OAS. A nucleus of about ten 
people within the dialogue also participate in the Forum and they have 
helped ensure that the Dialogue process helps to “feed” the forum. At 
times there have been uncertainties or even tensions within some of 
the parties about the two exercises (and confusion about which 
international organisation is responsible for which exercise) but over 
time the Dialogue and the Forum have become positive complements 
to each other. The key importance of the Forum was its commitment 
in July 2003 to unanimously respect and commit itself to the 
implementation of the Peace Agreements and to agree on a transparent 
and clean election process. 
 
 
9 Although the parties themselves established the Political Party Forum, all party 
representatives interviewed admit that the existing Dialogue group gave the main incentive 
to create this Forum of party leaders. 
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Finally, an indirect result of the dialogue process has been that the 
previously unknown IMD, in Guatemala popularly called the ‘Instituto 
Holandés’, has positioned itself as a reliable donor and actor with a 
strong commitment to supporting multiparty initiatives. Visits by 
Dutch politicians to Guatemala, but also the visit of Guatemalan 
politicians to observe the Dutch elections in January 2003, have 
contributed to create a solid a basis of confidence, which will be 
necessary for the development of future IMD activities. 
 
 
4.2 Results of the OAS programme 
 
The results of the two IMD-financed elements of the OAS programme 
(Best Practices seminar and support to the Comités Cívicos) cannot 
easily be assessed as they are relatively small parts of a larger 
programme, and the mission was not asked to provide an assessment 
of the overall OAS Democratic Values programme. Besides that, the 
element on the civil committees was still ongoing. However, we do 
perceive that the overall design and strategic vision of this programme 
is in a way more coherent and in the longer run more explicitly worked 
out compared to the UNDP-IMD Dialogue process.  
 
Of course, it has to be taken into account that the two programmes 
have different backgrounds and visions. Although both are clearly 
oriented at creating space for dialogue between the parties, UNDP 
focuses more on reconciliation in a broader sense (with other 
complementary programmes dealing with reconciliation in civil society) 
whereas OAS rather focuses on political stability by targeting more 
explicitly the party leaderships. A mid-term review of the OAS 
programme suggested that its implementation was still weakest in 
developing the relationships between parties and civil society 
organisations, especially with indigena organisations.10 In that sense the 
efforts of the two multilateral organisations can become more 
complementary if these comparative advantages are further articulated 
in a mutually reinforcing fashion. 
 
Given its size and its position, IMD can only play a modest role in 
strengthening coordination between these (and other) programmes. 
However, as the only external funder that supports both projects it can 
indeed play a mediating role, as it has done at several moments. It is 
therefore important that IMD continues its support to both 
programmes in the future, although preferably together with the larger 
bilateral donors 
 
 
 
10 See ‘Repaso del Programa Valores Democráticos y Gerencia Política de la UPD/OAS a 
petición de la Real Embajada de Noruega, Versión Final, 13 de mayo de 2003, p. 22. 
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4.3 Results of the bilateral projects 
 
Of the eight bilateral projects that had been approved in the period of 
evaluation, six had been completed by late July 2003. Of these six 
projects, one was a visit to Greece and Holland by three Guatemalan 
Congress members (not reviewed) and two were directly aimed at 
supporting activities of one political party (at the request of URNG 
and the Partido Unionista). The results of these two projects will be 
discussed first.  
 
 
Participation URNG cadre in Foro Sao Paulo (Guatemala, December 2002) 
 
The objective of the project, submitted in September 2002 to IMD, 
was to strengthen the political formation of about 140 active members 
of the URNG by participating in discussions with other leftist parties 
at the occasion of the 11th Foro Sao Paulo, held in Guatemala. The 
project consisted of four regional seminars to prepare the participants 
for the Forum and to discuss proposals by the URNG leadership, in 
which a total of approximately 500 members participated. The 
delegation to the Forum was deliberately balanced, with a high 
proportion of indigenas, women and youth. The outcome of the 
project was that (i) URNG was able to present a large delegation to the 
international forum of left-wing parties, (ii) a large number of URNG 
members had been able to participate in the preparatory Forum 
discussions, where the delegates were elected in a democratic way, and 
(iii) the participants in the Forum had been able to participate in 
international discussions with like-minded parties, contributing to 
improve their political formation. After completion of the Forum, the 
URNG seriously delayed the financial report of the project. 
 
Election training for leaders of the Partido Unionista (Guatemala, February 
2003) 
 
In order to prepare for the elections of November 2003 a group of 
over 800 active members of the Partido Unionista was trained in a two-
day course, followed (on the third day) by the National Assembly of 
the party. The formation consisted of a training in political ideology, 
content of party programme, the emerging Shared National Agenda, 
election strategy and a training of election candidates. Of the 
participants 42 % were women, 39 % indigena and 60 % was under the 
age of 35. The training course was evaluated by making a survey of 15 
% of the participants. The outcome of the activity was that 803 active 
party members had been formed and informed on the topics 
mentioned above and that a considerable share of the party 
membership had used the occasion to strengthen mutual ties and to 
discuss election strategies. It has to be mentioned that the project had 
been presented and planned by Secretary General Gustavo Porras, who 
a few months later withdrew from the party after he lost internal 
elections. 
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Training on new legislation for political parties by MINUGUA 
 
In 2002 three new laws were approved by Congress as part of the 
commitments to the Peace Agreements: Law on Decentralisation, the 
Municipal Code and the Law on Urban and Rural Development 
Committees. These laws are fundamental for consolidating democratic 
participation at the local level and therefore the programme PROLEY 
of MINUGUA organised training seminars for all political parties, a 
project financed by ASDI (Sweden) and IMD. Virtually all political 
parties were very interested to receive this training. The results of the 
first phase of the programme (July-October 2002) are that over a 
dozen training courses were realised for six different parties 
throughout the country with a total of 441 participants (of which 13 % 
were women). These active members are now able to explain the 
content of the three laws and their importance for democratic 
participation to their constituencies. The evaluation team visited one of 
these sessions in Jacaltenango (Partido Union Nacional) and was 
impressed by the capacity of the facilitators but also noted that the 
teaching method was rather traditional and that it could have more 
interactive.  
 
The importance of the project is that MINUGUA does not exclude 
any party for its courses. However, based on earlier experiences, it was 
decided to implement the courses separately for each party. Another 
positive element is that party leaders (Congress members and/or 
Secretary Generals) played an active role in the preparation and 
realisations of the meetings. It is remarkable that in the first phase of 
the programme the majority of cadre trained (52 %) was member of 
the Partido Unionista; in the second phase the participants are more 
evenly distributed over the various parties. The second phase will also 
have translations of the laws in Maya languages available, which were 
realised together with the Guatemalan Maya Language Academy. 
 
 
Seminar on Ideologies and Programmes in the 21st Century (April 2003) 
 
The objective of this IMD-organised seminar was to provide input 
from foreign political parties in developing a proper ideological debate 
in Guatemala as part of a process of modernising the political system. 
The two-day seminar included the participation of parties from Europe 
and Latin America. After several presentations, the participants further 
discussed the topics in working groups. The final report did not offer 
details on the number of participants, nor on the outcome of the 
seminar. According to several resource persons the seminar was useful 
and interesting, but it was hard to predict its impact on the ideological 
debate in Guatemala. These persons also suggested that a stronger role 
of the party internationals in Guatemala would probably have a greater 
impact. 
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Forums on indigenous political participation (May 2003) 
 
The project aims to increase participation of indigenous people in 
political parties by organising national and regional discussion meetings 
with national party leaders participating in the Multiparty Dialogue and 
leaders from Comités Civos and various indigena organisations. The 
main conclusions and demands of the first Regional meeting were 
presented at a National meeting in Tecpán in May 2003. The outcome 
of this process was that the topic of political participation of 
Indigenous peoples was put on the agenda of the political parties, 
although the response of the parties could have been a lot better. The 
project will require a number of follow-up activities (coherent analyses, 
training courses, involvement of more young participants, participation 
of Indigena mayors, etc.). A proposal for follow-up was presented to 
IMD for funding; three additional Regional meetings are still to be 
realised. 
 
 
4.4 Assessment of the results of the cross-party programmes 
 
The results achieved, and listed above, are definitely important but will 
have to be analysed in a broader framework. Below we will analyse 
some elements that will put the achievements of the dialogue process 
into a political perspective, given the central objective of IMD to 
strengthen the Guatemalan political party system in the longer run.  
 
 
Limited role of the Dialogue in strengthening the parties 
 
One of the purposes of the dialogue process is to strengthen the 
parties themselves. By helping educate some key persons in the parties, 
the dialogue has helped strengthen the potential leadership capacity 
within the parties. One should be cautious, however, about assuming 
that merely giving some training to two people in each party will itself 
have much effect on parties that suffer from a long list of profound 
structural deficiencies. Certainly some of the party representatives will 
try to bring back into their parties what they have learned in the 
dialogue process but it would be premature to declare that these 
persons will be effective “agents of change” within their parties given 
the powerful obstacles to change in almost all the parties. 
 
A related element, also acknowledged by the Dialogue group in its self-
evaluation, is that Guatemala currently has too many political parties 
(22 at the moment of evaluation), but only very few consolidated 
parties. Many parties collapse after the elections and many even totally 
disappear after four years. On the other hand, the need was felt to 
stimulate ideological diversity and to prevent that new parties would be 
quickly absorbed by traditional alliances. After all, often the smaller 
parties were providing innovative views. As it was stated by one of the 
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Dialogue participants: “we want to keep our ideological identity, like 
being part of a colorful fruit salad, rather than being diluted into a fruit 
punch”. This point also underscores the importance of reforming the 
Law on Political Parties, which will give better guarantees for smaller 
parties to survive financially. 
 
 
The relative value of national agendas 
 
The participants in the dialogue have valued their work on a shared 
national agenda. Elaborating the agenda helped the participants focus 
on the peace agreements (which have been almost abandoned since 
1999) and on how these accords can be taken forward. It would be 
premature and overreaching, however, to say that the shared national 
agenda represents the relaunching of the Peace Agreements. 
 
Given that the agenda has not yet been finished and not yet launched it 
is too early to judge its impact on the parties or on the national political 
scene. Although it will certainly be useful, some cautionary points are 
in order. First, it should be noted that Guatemala is rich with national 
agendas – agendas have been and continue to be produced by various 
groups (with the backing of a wide variety of international donors), 
which are all taking the Peace Agreements as the point of departure. As 
one participant in the dialogue comments to the evaluators, “this 
country has been hyper-diagnosed; we could have just started with the 
peace accords and gone from there rather than creating a new agenda.”  
 
Second, the agenda is a list of national policy priorities – it is the 
“what” but not the “how.” Thus, for example, the different parties 
were able to agree that the reduction of poverty is a priority. But they 
did not seek to come to agreement on the much harder, more divisive 
question of what measures and policies should be taken to reduce 
poverty. In other words, the level of agreement or consensus achieved 
only goes to a certain depth. The agenda is thus not in itself the basis 
for a legislative agenda for a new government or a policy agenda for 
opposition parties, although this is acknowledged by UNDP and IMD 
and plans are made to elaborate on the agenda in the following 
months. 
 
Third, Guatemalan politics are profoundly divided between the two 
main political forces (the ruling FRG and the economic elites 
represented by the PAN-related center-right forces in the opposition). 
This division is coming to a boiling point in the unfolding electoral 
process. Though the achievement of a shared national agenda by the 
multiparty dialogue process is a helpful exercise, it does not represent a 
bridge over this tremendously wide and deep divide in Guatemalan 
politics. This stark fact was underlined in July 2003 with the Forum on 
political parties: a week after the parties signed an ethics and non-
violence agreement related to the elections, the FRG unleashed a 
 
 31
                                                
savage burst of violence in the capital to protest the initial court 
rejection of Rios Montt’s candidacy.11 
 
 
Use of the Agenda in the near future 
 
The next six months will be crucial in the finalisation, launching, and 
use of the national agenda. Ideally this stage would have been reached 
three to six months earlier in order not to coincide with the electoral 
campaign but the fact that it will occur during the campaign can also be 
treated as an opportunity. During the campaign, however, parties will 
be very focused on the much narrower process of putting forward their 
candidates and their core messages rather than trying to engage in a 
broader debate on a national agenda. 
 
The arrival to power of a new government in January 2004 will also be 
an opportunity for the use of the agenda as a background to and 
possible stimulus for the development of a government programme. 
On the other hand it is very likely that the victorious party will come to 
power with its own program and intentions, which in turn might be 
undermining the whole exercise of have reached an agreement on the 
key issues of a National Agenda.  
 
In short, considerable thought will have to be given to how the agenda 
can be used both during the campaign and during the first several 
months of a new government. UNDP’s plans for this appear not that 
well-defined. It has focused more on disseminating the agenda within 
the parties themselves, especially at the level of departments and the 
municipalities. Meanwhile, to the surprise of the evaluation mission, 
UNDP had decided to cancel the third phase of the programme that 
focused on strengthening individual party programmes, or at least to 
postpone the implementation of this element until after the electoral 
campaign. 
 
4.5 Assessment of the results of the bilateral projects 
 
The bilateral projects component of the programme appears weakly 
developed, especially in comparison to the multiparty dialogue 
component. IMD Guatemala is actually not receiving many proposals 
from the parties. There is little sense of thematic focus to what grants 
have been made, other than very general ideas about participation. 
Clear selection criteria for the bilateral projects will have to be 
developed as part of a strategic vision about the role of these projects 
in relation to the cross-party projects. 
 
 
11 However, it should be acknowledged that the Dialogue group showed its coherence and 
strength by not temporarily suspending the participation of the FRG representatives, as 
was the case with the Forum on Political Parties. It is another example of how the Dialogue 
group currently performs a reconciling role in Guatemalan politics. 
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There have been problems with the administrative follow-up of some 
of the grants. There is also a lack of background knowledge of the 
relevant actors and issues with regard to some of the grants, such as 
the grant for indigenous participation. Moreover, there is already an 
abundance of training workshops, seminars, and conferences with the 
parties sponsored by other donors, often related to the same themes of 
participation of women, youth, and indigenous people. It is therefore 
required that IMD links up more closely with other funding agencies in 
order to see where its complementary ‘niche’ can lay. For example, 
some of the work on indigenous participation is also supported by 
many European (and particularly Dutch) NGOs and it is important not 
to duplicate efforts. 
 
IMD also needs to be very cautious about giving individual grants to 
political parties, even when the grants are paid out on an expense 
reimbursed bases. The parties have very little internal capacity to 
generate proposals and to implement the activities. And there is a 
strong danger of creating within the political party sector the same 
unhealthy pattern of supply-driven activities that dominates the NGO 
world. Apart from this administrative side, IMD should reconsider at 
all, as a multiparty initiative, to provide grants to individual parties. The 
experience with the two grants to individual political parties has 
generated little tangible results. Moreover, IMD runs the risk of being 
identified with particular ideological positions, which should be 
avoided as it can undermine its ‘multiparty’ profile. Therefore, bilateral 
support should always be part of a ‘package’ to multiple parties (as was 
done, for example, with the MINUGUA project in which various 
parties were trained on new legislation). 
 
 
Exchanges with Dutch political parties 
 
It does not appear that the effort to develop ties between the Dutch 
political parties and the Guatemalan parties has yet had much result. It 
is also not immediately apparent how useful the Dutch parties can be 
to the Guatemalan parties given that the Guatemalan parties are only 
nominally parties in the usual sense of the term. Guatemala does not so 
much need “party strengthening” as “party building,” which is a much 
more basic task, one that occasional exchange visits and seminars by 
foreign experts does not contribute much to. 
 
Despite this concern, representatives of the Guatemalan political 
parties positively valued the visits by Dutch politicians (as part of the 
‘mirror function’) and also appreciated the two visits to the 
Netherlands (one of these on the occasion of the January 2003 
elections). Through these visits they were, for example, informed about 
the procedures of the Social Planning Bureau, a semi-autonomous 
government body geared towards calculating the potential socio-
economic impact of election programmes. A similar institution does 
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not exist in Guatemala and, therefore, Dutch technical assistance could 
be helpful to set up such a Planning Bureau.  
 
When asked about the lessons from these visits, the representatives of 
the Dialogue group indicated, among other things, that they had seen 
how important the existence of strong and stable political parties are 
for a democratic political system. Also the total absence of election 
fraud, or even intentions in that direction, and the respectful 
relationships between government and opposition parties had 
impressed the visitors. It confirms how very different the political 
systems are in both countries and that more concrete lessons likely are 
to be learned from exchanges with other parties (and systems) in Latin 
America. 
 
 
4.6 Sustainability of the results  
 
In order to analyse the sustainability of the results described above, it is 
useful to review again some of the basic features of the current 
Guatemalan political party system. Several experts emphasized to the 
evaluators that political parties in Guatemala are fundamentally weaker 
than in other Central American countries. In their view, though there 
are almost two dozen political parties in Guatemala today, there are no 
“real” political parties.12 Instead, Guatemalan political life is dominated 
by two political forces, the FRG and PAN, neither of which is best 
thought of in terms of a political party. 
 
Guatemalan citizens express no confidence in or respect for their 
political parties, nor in the electoral process, which is expressed by 
extremely low voter participation. Political parties are seen as 
dominated by corrupt, self-interested politicians. The parties have 
incoherent ideological bases and their relationship to society is 
superficial and usually opportunistic. Despite various political party aid 
initiatives during the 1990s, including many training seminars 
sponsored by Guatemalan and foreign organisations, there has been no 
discernable improvement in the system of political parties. 
 
The sustainability of the results of the multiparty dialogue, and its 
related projects, have to be understood against this background. 
Results are probably not visible in the elaboration of party programmes 
(if they will drafted up at all), but rather in the existence of a 
committed small group of Dialogue participants that will be elected 
into the new Congress. This group, that has gone through the whole 
process of intense debates with other politicians and that reached a 
consensus on a national agenda, will have to guarantee that the 
 
12 This also holds true for the URNG, the former coalition of the four armed revolutionary 
organisations, which – though possessing a genuine political base and an internal 
organisation – is nonetheless quite weak and still in a process of transforming itself into a 
political party. 
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outcome of the Dialogue process is translated into new legislation and 
into the construction of a new political culture. It is estimated that 
about 15 Dialogue participants will be elected. They will serve as the 
main intermediaries for UNDP-IMD to their parties in following up 
on the multiparty dialogue. 
 
Another possible source of sustainability could be represented by a 
future multiparty training institute for party cadre, a proposal that was 
suggested on several occasions to the evaluators and for which several 
donors expressed some interest. However, other observers doubt that 
a new institution will solve the structural causes of a deficient political 
party system. But as part of the ‘mirror function’ of IMD, it is a 
positive sign that the Guatemalan partners have been inspired by the 
idea of setting up their own multiparty institute, leaving aside whoever 
would be willing to fund such an initiative. 
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5. Implementation modalities 
 
Next to assessing and analysing results of IMD’s programme the 
evaluation mission was also requested to judge a number of issues 
related to the implementation of the programme in Guatemala (see the 
Introduction). The following chapter addresses these issues by 
combining them into four different clusters: 
 
• Coherence of programme design and implementation; 
ownership of the programme by the parties; 
• Programme management, organisation of the Guatemala 
office, registration and documentation of projects; 
• Cooperation with other donors and value-added of IMD 
programme compared to these donors; 
• Quality of evaluation and monitoring, including comments on 
the current evaluation process. 
 
5.1 Coherence of programme design and implementation 
 
As was stated in the previous chapters, the choice to work with UNDP 
and to support their multiparty dialogue programme has been a 
fortunate decision. UNDP was well-placed and well-equipped to start 
up this dialogue project, although the OAS in principle was more 
experienced in this field. The decision, after some pressure from the 
Dutch Embassy, to support both programmes, was therefore even 
more important and has given IMD a good and credible image in 
Guatemala. This positive profile provides a solid basis for further 
elaborating IMD’s presence in the country. 
 
However, it cannot be denied that IMD has taken some huge risks. 
First of all the choice to start up its major pilot programme in a 
country with one of the most unstable political party systems of the 
continent can be questioned. A second risk was to support the UNDP 
pilot project with a grant that equalled more than 10 % of its entire 
international budget without sharing this potential risk with other 
donors. A third risk was to create frictions at the start of the 
programme by profiling itself as a multiparty institute, while 
simultaneously prioritising bilateral support to particular political 
parties. The fourth risk was to plan the programme rather tightly 
towards the general elections of 2003, while knowing that any major 
delay would mean that the final stretch of the dialogue process would 
coincide with the election campaign. The fifth risk was to have this 
programme monitored and developed by a (Dutch and Guatemalan) 
staff without major political experience in the country. 
 
That all these potential risks, apart from the delay, were eventually 
neutralised is in fact a miracle. It is due to the professional capacity of 
the UNDP staff, the quality of the dialogue method, and the 
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supportive role of local experts, other donors and international 
organisations who recognised the enormous value of a multiparty 
dialogue in this stage of Guatemala’s political process. It is also due to 
the good relationships that were developed between IMD and the 
representatives of the political parties, especially after the Dialogue 
process proved to be of a high quality generating an atmosphere of 
mutual confidence among the parties. 
 
The bilateral programme, that was meant to be complementary to the 
multiparty dialogue process, suffers from a lack of coherence and 
political vision. The decision to request the parties to submit their 
project proposals was in hindsight probably not a good idea. Not only 
did this generate very few requests, but the quality was generally not 
very high. More recently initiated bilateral projects focusing on political 
participation of civil society groups are certainly justified, but require 
better preparation and coordination with other donors supporting 
similar activities. Moreover, the rapid expansion of IMD’s Guatemala 
programme caused some administrative pressures, which will be 
further discussed below. 
 
The ownership by the political parties of the multiparty dialogue 
programme is positively valued according to an internal evaluation of 
UNDP-IMD in April 2003. However, the evaluation team also 
received opposite views. Some participants of the Dialogue group 
voiced their concern that UNDP was too strictly defining the content 
and the agenda of the dialogue process. It was felt that the parties were 
‘actors’ in the process of drafting a Shared National Agenda, rather 
than that it was their own programme. These voices will have to be 
taken more seriously in the early design of the follow-up to the UNDP 
programme, for example, by involving the (newly elected) political 
parties more closely in the preparations of this new phase. 
 
5.2 Programme management 
 
A local IMD office was set up in Guatemala City in March 2002 to 
administer the programme. Located at the premises of the research 
institute ASIES, the office has a staff of three people: the IMD country 
representative (Doris Cruz), an administrative assistant (Carmen Trejo), 
and a bookkeeper (Rene Cifuentes). IMD’s country representative is a 
former UNDP employee who has lived almost 20 years in the 
Netherlands. She was selected for her knowledge of both Guatemala 
and the Netherlands and for her qualities to deal with local politicians 
and with delegations from abroad.  
 
The main tasks of the office are to maintain contacts with the political 
party members involved in the Dialogue programme, to maintain 
contacts with other donors and the Dutch Embassy, to provide 
information to the Headquarters in The Hague, to organise foreign 
visits and delegations and to administer requests and funds related to 
the bilateral projects. Currently, the IMD office is not registered in 
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Guatemala as a legal entity, which is apparently a deliberate choice. The 
country representative is directly accountable to the Director of IMD 
and has a certain degree of decision-making power for the smaller 
bilateral projects, after consulting the Director. 
 
In the first phase of the programme, from early 2002 up to May 2003, 
the Guatemala programme was administered and supported on the 
Dutch side by a IMD Programme Officer located at the offices of one 
of the political parties (in this case Ellen van Koppen of the Labour 
Party PvdA). Political support and supervision was handled by one of 
the Board members (Alvaro Pinto, PvdA), who regularly travelled to 
Guatemala to coordinate with the country representative.  
 
In June 2003 this model was readjusted: a new Policy Officer for Latin 
America (Heleen Schrooyen) was contracted to take over the 
administrative supervision, whereas the political supervision was 
extended to a council consisting of Programme Officers from several 
political parties. This gradual readjustment was a result of the 
establishment of a new IMD office in The Hague in 2002, following a 
decision by the Board to professionalize the institute and to acquire 
more government funding. These organisational changes also included 
the introduction of a new centralised ‘project management system’, in 
which all projects would be registered with standard procedures for 
approval and administration.  
 
At the time of the evaluation this system was not yet operational and 
obviously still in a preparatory phase. The evaluation team was in fact 
struck by the absence of a systematic project administration containing 
detailed overviews of bilateral projects, disbursements, project 
proposals, etc. Apparently, ‘internal project approval requests’ (in 
Dutch: afwegingsmemo’s) of many projects, even for those that had 
been finalised already, had not been produced; only final reports from 
the partners had been submitted in a satisfactory way. The absence of 
clear project approval criteria, systematic project identification systems, 
and even project numbers or disbursement overviews gave the 
impression of a deficient project administration. Given the size of the 
Guatemala programme, IMD is advised to give a high priority in 
dealing with these matters. 
 
The deficiencies are partly caused by the rapid growth of the 
programme, especially since late 2002. The country representative has 
therefore requested an extension of her staff with an additional 
assistant. Although the evaluators acknowledge this need, it would be 
good to take this decision after reassessing the overall function and 
management of the local office. The need for an IMD country 
representative is not in question: given the importance and size of the 
programme, and given the complex and unstable political situation, a 
strong local office is definitely providing an added value for IMD’s 
presence in Guatemala. 
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The role and composition of the Advisory Board to the programme 
also needs some rethinking and readjusting. The current group of ten 
outstanding advisors have played a key role in the launch of the 
multiparty dialogue programme, and have been very committed to 
support the country representative. However, since the majority of its 
members are in fact ‘stakeholders’ of IMD projects, it cannot be 
expected that they are at all times a source of independent advice. It is 
recommended to split up the ‘coordination role’ of the Advisory Board 
(which is indeed a key role) and the ‘advisory role’ by a group of 
independent experts. This new group can provide important input in 
the future strategy of the programme, which, according to many 
resource persons interviewed, will require more focus and coherence. 
 
5.3 Cooperation with other donors  
 
One of our discussion partners commented that Guatemala was 
currently saturated by donor projects prioritising support to political 
parties and strengthening the political system. With the elections 
approaching, the supply of these projects has reached such a level that 
the parties are almost unable to handle all these offers. This is not to 
say that IMD has no role to play anymore. To the contrary: we found 
an overall consensus among political parties, donor agencies and 
experts that IMD’s activities in Guatemala are in fact crucial and that it 
should continue its presence in the coming years. 
 
The added value of IMD, compared to many other donor 
programmes, is two-fold. First, IMD is the only donor actively 
supporting the two key multilateral cross-party programmes in 
Guatemala (of the UNDP and the OAS) and has indirectly contributed 
to make these programmes more complementary by providing 
opportunities for coordination and dialogue. Although a constructive 
collaboration between the two large multilateral organisations appears 
to be quite difficult (and characterised by insiders as ‘respectful 
competition’), there seems to be at least some mutual reinforcement 
which has been facilitated by IMD. 
 
The second element that adds value to IMD’s presence in Guatemala is 
its focus on “multipartyism” rather than preferential support to 
individual parties and on consensus rather than political confrontation. 
At the same time, IMD is not the only external actor taking a 
multiparty approach to party aid in Guatemala. Norway and Denmark 
are doing so through their support for the OAS programme, Konrad 
Adenauer is doing so through its support for the political party 
seminars organized by ASIES, and Sweden’s political party aid, which 
is just now being launched, will also take a multiparty approach and 
involve at least six different Swedish party foundations working 
together. Again, the multiparty approach does not exclude support to 
individual parties, as long as this is part of a package offered to 
multiple parties in which none of these parties will receive a 
preferential treatment. 
 
 39
 
The mutual coordination with other international donors is good, but 
can still be improved. IMD correctly consulted all the larger donors in 
the preparatory phase of the programme, but failed to follow up on 
particular key contacts. Especially several Nordic government agencies, 
all working in the same ‘saturated’ field, suggested that IMD would 
benefit from more regular consultations and exchanges of information. 
In addition, IMD is advised to open up regular contacts with other 
European NGOs (both party foundations and development agencies), 
so as to avoid any overlap in activities and to guarantee 
complementarity. Given its multiparty character, IMD is potentially 
well-placed to play a leading role in improving coordination between 
these agencies and to bridge the gap with the larger donors. 
 
5.4 Monitoring and evaluation 
 
Requested by the newly established IMD office in The Hague, the 
Guatemala office started developing its own monitoring and evaluation 
system in early 2003. Previously no monitoring or evaluation had been 
done in a systematic manner. The research institute ASIES, with a long 
tradition of analysing political parties, was asked to develop an 
evaluation model that would be used for all ongoing activities and 
projects. Based on a log-frame analysis, ASIES completed the design of 
such a model in June 2003. The idea was to implement this model and 
to submit a first evaluation report of all completed projects to the 
evaluation team, but practical obstacles had delayed this report. 
However, ASIES did assist in the realisation of a self-evaluation of the 
Dialogue group, which has proven to be useful for the current report. 
 
The model developed by ASIES is very solid and detailed, but also 
rather traditional. It is not easy to apply for those who are not 
acquainted with the logical framework and it therefore requires 
permanent technical support from the ASIES monitoring team. 
Another concern is that the model will generate many (mostly 
quantitative) data, which can become too diverse to process. Also, the 
model is less geared towards generating qualitative data or information 
about for example project relevance or strategic vision. However, as a 
first start it will be quite helpful for IMD in collecting data and 
outcomes regarding all its projects, which are currently barely available. 
After one year it will be necessary to review how this new monitoring 
system is working in practice and which adjustments might be needed. 
 
By way of recommendation, it is important that IMD primarily selects 
data generated by monitoring and evaluation that are useful for 
improving its own programme design and implementation, rather than 
being concerned too much about by its accountability to the donor and 
other (secondary) stakeholders. The organisation and preparation of 
the current exercise suggests that IMD is eager to develop such a 
learning approach to evaluation, although this will take some time. 
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Several useful lessons can be drawn from this external evaluation. For 
example, it was clear that many partners and stakeholders were 
unhappy with the timing of the evaluation: in the middle of the busy 
election campaign and halfway the implementation of the UNDP-IMD 
project. Better consultation of the stakeholders could have prevented 
unnecessary tension. The input promised to the evaluation team (self-
evaluation by the Dialogue group, and monitoring outputs provided by 
ASIES) was either not ready or produced under considerable pressure. 
Some of the partners were even not sure whether their own 
programmes were evaluated or whether it was an evaluation of the 
IMD programme as such. IMD seems to be conscious of these 
shortcomings and has promised better preparations and consultations 
in future evaluations. 
 
The evaluation team therefore proposes the following suggestions for 
future (external) evaluations of IMD’s programme: 
 
• All organisations involved in an evaluation process will have to 
be informed in an early stage (and explicitly) about the 
objectives and methods of an evaluation, and preferably also 
contribute to the drafting of the Terms of Reference; 
• The stakeholders are to benefit primarily from an evaluation 
and not the donors, which has consequences for the design of 
the exercise and for the eventual feed-back process; 
• The evaluation team should be smaller (two or three persons) 
but spend more time (at least two weeks) in the ‘field’ so that a 
superficial and rapid schedule can be avoided; 
• A preparatory exercise, such as a self-evaluation, is very useful 
as an input to any evaluation process, as it is helpful to limit the 
evaluation focus and to better prepare the programme (in that 
sense, it was a pity that the self-evaluation of the Dialogue 
group was implemented so late); 
• Large meetings with entire delegations should be kept to a 
minimum, as these are only useful for well-prepared focus 
group discussions. The smaller meetings, with just one person 
being interviewed, were much more useful to the team; 
• The evaluation team should be independent and not include 
any persons who represent organisations that are direct 
beneficiaries of the programme; 
• Attendance of IMD staff at the evaluation interview meetings 
should be avoided; 
• The programme of the evaluation should include more 
meetings with direct beneficiaries, civil society groups and 
independent experts. 
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6. Conclusions 
 
 
The following general conclusions can be drawn from this external 
evaluation process: 
 
1. Political context 
• The 1996 Peace Agreements provided the context for an end 
to social and political polarisation and the start of a process of 
democratisation 
• The political party system in Guatemala has been unstable, 
fragmented, polarised and discredited. Political parties were 
often not more than electoral machines, lacking a 
programmatic and ideological base, and figure among the 
weakest actors in society 
• Political participation by citizens has been very low, especially 
among indigenous people that represent at least half of the 
population 
• At the November 2003 elections a new Congress will be 
elected that is of crucial importance to get new legislation 
approved, needed for democratic consolidation 
 
2. Programme design 
• IMD initiated its Guatemala programme in March 2002 after 
two identification missions proposed to develop a joint venture 
with UNDP on political party strengthening, complemented by 
a range of bilateral projects 
• A local IMD office was started up in 2002 with a local 
representative 
• A two-year core project with UNDP was started to develop a 
National Agenda with all registered political parties in a 
multiparty dialogue process; IMD is the only donor 
• Parallel, an OAS project on Democratic Values with a similar 
approach was also supported by IMD, together with other 
donors 
• A number of bilateral projects complementing the cross-party 
programmes were funded, including two projects supporting 
(progressive) individual parties 
 
3. Programme results 
• Despite two major obstacles during the implementation of the 
Dialogue process (delayed start leading to a coincidence with 
the electoral campaign, and donor pressure to present the 
Agenda), the programme was very well executed by UNDP 
• The main result of the Dialogue was the training and formation 
of a group of 40 party members who appropriated the 
development of a Shared National Agenda and who created a 
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space for debate and mutual respect between the parties that 
did not exist anywhere else in Guatemala 
• The creation of the Forum on Political Parties was indirectly a 
result of the Dialogue process: the Dialogue group and the 
Forum interacted in a complementary sense 
• Due to the success of the programmes, IMD gained a credible 
image as the ‘Instituto Holandés’, which played a mediating 
role between OAS and UNDP  
• The bilateral projects generated mixed results, mainly due to a 
lack of strategic vision 
 
4. Asssessment of results 
• Despite the successful Dialogue, it is premature to believe that 
the participants will act as ‘agents of change’ in their respective 
parties 
• The potential impact of the National Agenda is limited by the 
inflation of other national agendas, as yet unclear strategies to 
implement these, and by political polarisation 
• There is a risk that the victorious party in the next elections will 
ignore the agreements reached in the Dialogue process 
• IMD, as a multiparty initiative, should avoid providing grants 
to individual parties when this is not part of a multiparty 
package 
• Exchange programmes of (Dutch) parliamentarians contribute 
little to party building 
 
5. Sustainability of results 
• A follow-up project will have to work further with the elected 
party members of the Dialogue group, or at least use them as 
intermediaries to their parties 
• The creation of a multiparty institute in Guatemala is an 
interesting idea, but should be sustained by local funding and 
not by IMD 
 
6. Programme coherence and ownership 
• Although the cross-party programmes, especially the OAS 
programme, reflected a coherent approach and a strategic 
vision, this was often lacking in the bilateral projects 
• IMD has taken considerable risks with the UNDP project, in 
which it invested a relatively large grant as a single donor with 
problematic preconditions 
• The ownership of the Dialogue programme by the political 
parties is positively valued by UNDP and IMD, but several 
parties have voiced their concerns about this ownership 
 
7. Programme management 
• IMD has no clear criteria for the identification and approval of 
(bilateral) projects 
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• The local office lacks a well-functioning project management 
system, although this is currently being introduced 
• The current workload of the local IMD staff has to be dealt 
with 
• The existence of a local IMD office is of great value for the 
implementation of the programme and the representation of 
the institute 
• The Advisory Board has functioned well at the start of the 
programme but needs to be reorganised as it is currently not 
the proper source for independent advice 
 
8. Value added of IMD 
• The value-added of IMD lies in its complementary support to 
the two cross-party programmes and in its ‘multiparty’ focus, 
rather than in its support to individual political parties 
 
9. Cooperation with other donors 
• Coordination with other donors has been satisfactory, but can 
be improved, especially with the Nordic agencies supporting 
similar programmes 
• IMD will have to expand its contacts with European NGOs, 
both political foundations as well as development agencies; 
IMD can possibly play a bridging role with other (bilateral) 
donors when it concerns ‘political aid’ 
 
10. Monitoring and evaluation 
• The new monitoring system developed by ASIES is a welcome 
improvement, but is still rather traditional with the risk of 
generating to many (quantitative) data 
• IMD is eager to develop a learning approach to evaluation 
• The self-evaluations prepared for this evaluation were useful, 
but produced under pressure and rather donor-oriented 
• Future (external) evaluations will have to involve programme 
beneficiaries more closely in the design and the implementation 
phase 
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7. Recommendations 
 
 
The evaluation team was requested to make recommendations on five 
terrains: (i) future direction of the programme, (ii) more effective 
resource allocation, (iii) role of local IMD office, (iv) increasing 
programme impact, and (v) improving ownership. 
 
 
7.1 Future direction of the programme 
 
Several factors combine to make it imperative that IMD develop a new 
strategy for Guatemala: (i) the UNDP-IMD Dialogue project is coming 
to a natural endpoint, (ii) the political context is entering a period of 
possible instability and potentially explosive change, (iii) the political 
party scene in Guatemala has in the past two years become remarkably 
saturated with international assistance and many of these activities are 
offered on a multiparty basis.  
 
IMD should therefore consider several different options for its future 
programme direction: 
 
• Bring the current project to conclusion in 2004 and then pull 
out of the country, in recognition of the fact that Guatemala is 
already receiving more political party assistance than any other 
Latin American country; 
• Carry the multiparty dialogue process forward. IMD could 
work with UNDP to develop a new phase of the multiparty 
dialogue process. Any continuation of this process will have to 
take account of the very different political context that will 
emerge after the elections: some of the parties will make it into 
Congress and will focus much of their political efforts there; 
many other parties will not make it into Congress and most of 
these will close down or go into dormancy. In this context 
there will be less interest in and demand for a multiparty 
dialogue of the type that has been carried out over the past 15 
months. Such a dialogue will also be less relevant in that most 
attention will be focused on the development of a new 
government programme and the positioning of the opposition 
parties with respect to that programme; 
• Focusing on one or two specific issues relating to the reform of 
the party system. IMD could for example decide to focus on 
what will be one of the main issues relating to party reform in 
the post-election context – the new Law on Political Parties 
and Elections. IMD could sponsor an inter-related series of 
activities (a national conference, training of experts, training of 
journalists, etc.) on the issue with the intention of helping 
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stimulate the process of developing, passing, and implementing 
a new law;  
• Focusing on one or two specific issues regarding participation. 
Almost all the international actors working with the political 
parties are trying to increase participation of women, youth, 
and indigenous people. IMD could choose one of these areas, 
such as women or youth, as a main focus and concentrate on it 
fully, making it IMD’s areas of specialisation; 
• Concentrate on working with those parties represented in the 
new Congress, with a focus on technical assistance directly 
related to helping those parties be effective in the Congress, 
such as in law drafting, legislative strategy, multiparty 
negotiations, constituent relations, and so forth. The parties in 
the new Congress will certainly be in need of such assistance 
but at the same time it is likely that there will be various donors 
eager to provide such help. IMD should move in this direction 
therefore only if it determines that it can provide something 
that other donors will not be providing; 
• Focusing on internal party building with those parties not in 
Congress. It is certain that there will be a large amount of 
international donor attention on those parties represented in 
the new Congress, both training of deputies as well as internal 
party capacity building. IMD could take a different approach 
and develop a programme to work with all registered parties 
not in Congress to help them build and develop in the lean 
years until the next election. 
 
The evaluation team would advise IMD not to withdraw at this 
moment from Guatemala, as it has to capitalise on the credibility that 
was build up over the past 15 months. Close coordination with other 
(especially Nordic) funders and continued support to the UNDP and 
OAS programmes seems to be a wise step forward. 
 
 
7.2 More effective resource allocation 
 
Up to January 2004, when the new Congress and Government will take 
office, it will be very difficult for IMD to make major decisions about 
future project allocations. It is recommended that a mission visits 
Guatemala after mid-January to speak to newly elected Congress 
members, especially those that have been participating in the Dialogue 
group, to identify their particular needs and to analyse the new political 
situation.  
 
It is also recommended to explore possibilities to complement support 
activities of USAID and IDB to the new Congress, however from a 
multiparty perspective. 
 
In the meantime, IMD can focus on the following issues: 
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• Reassess ongoing project requests in the light of a new future 
strategy; 
• Review the new monitoring and evaluation systems set up by 
ASIES; 
• Reassess and possibly reorganise the local IMD office. 
 
 
7.3 Role of the local IMD office 
 
It is recommended to maintain the current country representation as 
this presence is of crucial importance to further develop and monitor 
IMD’s programme in the future. The institute needs to maintain its 
regular contacts with representatives from the Dutch Embassy, 
UNDP, OAS and other funders, as well as its contacts with the 
political parties. A local presence can also be beneficial for developing 
a higher profile at the local level, where IMD is virtually unknown, and 
in circles of civil society actors. 
 
Meanwhile, it will be important to address some of the weaknesses 
identified in the evaluation report, such as: 
 
• Restructuring the Advisory Board; 
• Improvement of project management systems; 
• Developing explicit project allocation criteria; 
• Strengthening and training the local staff. 
 
 
7.4 Increasing programme impact 
 
The impact of IMD’s programme can be increased by paying attention 
to the following issues: 
 
• Drawing clear lessons from project evaluations; 
• Avoiding individual and isolated support to political parties and 
prioritising a multiparty approach; 
• Introducing a more pro-active approach to project 
identification; 
• Making more use of diplomatic channels for political pressure; 
• Drawing media attention for delegation visits; 
• Trying to avoid the allocation of large grants, and use a more 
strategic and diversified approach to resource allocation. 
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7.5 Improving ownership 
 
Although the Dialogue method tries to lay the ownership with the 
political parties, there have been some concerns about the dominant 
role of UNDP. In order to improve ownership of the programme, one 
can think of: 
 
• Active involvement of the parties in designing the next phase 
of the programme; 
• Establishing an advisory board to UNDP-IMD composed of 
Dialogue participants. 
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Annex I: List of persons interviewed 
 
 
 
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (IMD) 
 
Doris Cruz IMD: Country Representative 
Guatemala 
Guatemala, 28 July 
03; Huehuetenango, 
2 Aug 03* 
Mark Dijk* IMD: Policy Officer Africa The Hague, 23 July 
03 
Ellen van Koppen* Labour party (PvdA) 
Programme Officer for IMD 
Amsterdam, 28 Aug 
03 
Roel von Meijenfeldt* IMD: Executive Director The Hague, 23 July 
03;  
20 Aug 03 
Alvaro Pinto Scholtbach* IMD: Board member and 
International Secretary Dutch 
Labour Party (PvdA) 
Amsterdam, 29 Aug 
03 
Heleen Schrooyen* IMD: Policy Officer Latin 
America 
The Hague, 3 & 23 
July 03; 20 Aug03 
Jan Tuit* IMD: Senior Policy Officer The Hague, 23 July 
03 
 
IMD partners in Guatemala 
 
Miguel Angel Balcárcel UNDP: Coordinator 
Multiparty Dialogue 
Programme 
Guatemala, 28, 30 
July 03; 5 Aug 03 
Elena Diez Pinto UNDP: Technical Advisor 
Regional Democratic Dialogue 
Porgramme 
Guatemala, 30 July 
03;  
5 Aug 03 
Fernando Masaya UNDP: Project Officer Guatemala, 30 July 
03;  
5 Aug 03 
Christina Ellich UNDP: Project Officer Guatemala, 30 July 
03;  
5 Aug 03 
Rolando Robles 
Soñia González 
UNDP: Assistents Multiparty 
Dialogue Programme 
Guatemala, 30 July 
03;  
5 Aug 03 
Juan Pablo Corlazzoli United Nations: Resident 
Coordinator Guatemala 
Guatemala, 31 July 
03 
Marco Antonio Barahona 
Muñoz 
Hans Quevedo, Raquel 
Zelaya 
Karin Erbsen de 
Maldonado 
Carlos Escobar Armas 
Edmundo Uruttia 
ASIES: Research coordinators 
and board representatives 
Guatemala, 29 July 
03 
Juan Luis Castilla 
Virginia Barrios Fuentes 
Luis Felipe Linares López 
ASIES: Monitoring Project Guatemala, 29 July 
03 
Ana Isabel Garita MINUGUA: Director 
PROLEY 
Guatemala, 29 July 
03 
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Manuela Alvarado 
Ramiro López Ramírez 
Former member of Congress; 
encuentro pueblos indígenas  
Guatemala, 31 July 
03; Quetzaltenango, 
4 Aug 03  
Ricardo Gómez , Ana 
Isabel Garita, Raquel 
Zelaya, Christina Ellich 
UNDP: Advisory Group 
Multiparty Dialogue 
Programme 
Guatemala, 31 July 
03 
Eduardo Núñez OAS: Coordinator ‘Programa 
Valores Democraticos y 
Gerencia Política’ 
Guatemala, 1 Aug 03 
Ricardo Stein SOROS Foundation 
Guatemala: Executive Director 
Guatemala, 1 Aug 03 
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Political party representatives (Guatemala) 
 
José Mauricio Rodriguez Partido Unión Democrática: 
Secretario General Adjunta 
Guatemala, 29 July 
03 
Olga Cristina Camey de 
Noack 
Alianza GANA: Member of 
Congress 
Guatemala, 29 July 
03 
Patricia Orantes Alianza GANA: Assistant to 
Eduardo Stein; Member of 
Dialogue  
Guatemala, 29 July 
03 
Sulema Paz de Rodriguez FRG: Member of Congress Guatemala, 30 July 
03 
Jorge Mario Ríos Muñoz FRG: Chair of the Legislative 
Technical Support Committee  
Guatemala, 30 July 
03 
UNDP-IMD Dialogue 
Group  
(appr. 20 members) 
Presentation self evaluation, 
facilitated by ASIES 
Guatemala, 31 July 
03 
Hugo Villatoro, Oscar 
Palacios 
Carlos Rivas 
Alianza GANA: local 
campaigning group 
Huehuetenango, 2 
Aug 03 
José Antonio, Carmen Partido Unión Nacional Jacaltenango, 3 Aug 
03 
Jesús Cifuentes, Alfonso 
Tobar 
Felipe Santos, Guillermo 
Mendoza 
Bertha de Leon, Chulasca 
Geron 
Americo Geron, Julio 
Hernández 
Partido CASA Quetzaltenango, 4 
Aug 03 
Roberto Casas, Manuela 
Alvarado 
Ricardo Cajas, Abraham 
Velazquez 
Daniel Tucux, Martin 
Alvarado 
Comité Cívico Xeljú Quetzaltenango, 4 
Aug 03 
Miguel Ordóñez, Iris 
López 
Valeriano Pérez, Augusto 
de Leon 
Juan Antonio Zalanec, 
Israel Zacadeu 
Comité’s Cívicos de Sololá, San 
Marcos la Laguna, Cantanel 
Quetzaltenango, 4 
Aug 03 
Nineth Montenegro ANN: Member of Congress Guatemala, 5 Aug 03 
 
International donors and diplomats 
 
Hans Petter Buvollen* UNDP: Coordinator Civil 
Society Programme 
Guatemala, 27 July 
03 
Anja Stuckert Friedrich Ebert Stiftung: 
Guatemala Representative 
Guatemala, 30 July 
03 
Jorge Molina Valdivieso Ambassador of Chile Guatemala, 29 July 
03 
Maria Leissner Ambassador of Sweden Guatemala, 31 July 
03 
Arend Pieper* Dutch Embassy: Charge 
d’Affairs 
Guatemala, 5 Aug 03 
Marijke Otten Dutch Embassy: Deputy 
Charge d’Affairs 
Guatemala, 28 July 
03 
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Hans Magnusson Policy Officer ASDI; Swedish 
Embassy 
Guatemala, 6 Aug 03 
Barbara Pesce-Monteiros UNDP: Adjunct Resident 
Coordinator 
Guatemala, 31 July 
03 
Guri Rusten Norwegian Embassy: Project 
Officer NORAD 
Guatemala, 5 Aug 03 
Klaus Wulff Danish Embassy: Coordinator 
PRODECA 
Guatemala, 6 Aug 03 
 
Other resource persons 
 
Gustavo Porras Ex Secretary General Partido 
Unionista;  
Guatemala, 28 July 
03 
Frank La Rue CALDH: Executive Director Guatemala, 5 Aug 03 
Mario Polanco GAM: Executive Director Guatemala, 5 Aug 03 
Gabriel Aguilera Peralta Vice-Minister of Foreign 
Affairs 
Guatemala, 6 Aug 03 
*) Interviewed by Kees Biekart only 
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Annex II: List of documents reviewed 
 
 
Published documents: 
 
• ASIES (2002) ‘Diagnóstico del funcionamiento del sistema de 
partidos políticos en Guatemala’. Revista ASIES. No. 1. 
• ASIES (2003) Guatemala: Monografía de los partidos políticos 
2000-2002 (Mayo) 
• ASIES (2003) Agenda nacional 2003-2008: Una propuesta 
(Junio). 
• International IDEA (1998) Democracy in Guatemala: The 
mission for an entire people. Synthesis Report. Stockholm: 
IDEA. 
• IMD (2002) IMD partner in democracy – Annual Report. The 
Hague, IMD. 
• Pruitt, Bettye & Kaufer, Karin (2002) ‘Dialogue as a tool for 
peaceful confllict transformation’. Reflections, Vol. 3, No. 4. 
• Sánchez del Valle, Rosa (2000) ‘Comités cívicos: hacia una 
coexistencia de plataformas políticas departementales?. 
Materiales de estudio y trabajo, no. 33. Guatemala, Fundación 
Friedrich Ebert. 
• Sistema de las Naciones Unidos en Guatemala (2002) 
‘Guatemala: Desarrollo humano, mujeres y salud’. Informe 
nacional de desarollo humano. Guatemala, SNU. 
• QONOJEL (2003) Construyendo una agenda de nación (Julio). 
 
 
Internal documents IMD: 
 
Project reports: 
• Actividad comités cívicos OAE-IMD. Antigua, 29-30 de 
septiembre de 2002. 
• Informe del proyecto “Contribuyendo a la formación y 
desarrollo político de la militancia de URNG durante el 11 
Foro de Sao Paulo. Guatemala, septiembre de 2002 – enero de 
2003. 
• Informe técnico de ejecución: “Capacitación a líderes 
Unionistas frente al proceso electoral. Guatemala, 12 de 
febrero 2003. 
• Programa de divulgación con partidos políticos sobre 
legislación de participación social y gobiernos locales. 
Proley/Minugua. Guatemala, 7 de noviembre 2002. 
• Seminario internacional: “Ideología y programa en los partidos 
políticos del siglo XXI. Guatemala, 3-4 de abril 2003. 
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• Seminario internacional : “Factores constitutivos y desafíos 
contemporáneos, las mejores prácticas en Europa y América 
Latina”. Guatemala, 7-9 de abril 2003. 
• Informe final “Encuentro nacional sobre la participación 
política de los pueblos indígenas en los partidos políticos t 
comités cívicos”. Tecpan, Chimaltenago, 30-31 de mayo 2003. 
• Programa de diálogo multipartidario, PNUD-IMD 
(Compilación de presentaciones y informes de los talleres). 
2002/03. 
 
Reports of visits: 
• Rapport bezoek Guatemala 2-11 juli en New York 12-13 juli 
2001 (Alvaro Pinto). 
• Verslag IMD-missie Guatemala 3-10 februari 2002 (Pinto, Van 
Gennip, Pormes, Van Koppen). 
• Informe de la visita de observación de las elecciones generales 
en Holanda, auspiciado por el IMD. Enero de 2003. 
• Informe de viaje a Grecia (8-10 de marzo 2003) y Holanda (12-
13 de marzo 2003), Olga Camey (PU), Nineth Montenegro 
(ANN) y Sulema Paz de Rodriguez (FRG). 
• Report IMD mission to Guatemala (Roel von Meijenfeldt, 
Exceutive Director, IMD). Guatemala, 13-17 April 2003. 
• Conclusies missie naar Guatemala (Bert Koenders). 8 augustus 
2003. 
 
Evaluation reports: 
• Berntzen, Einar (ed.) ‘Repaso del programa Valores 
Democráticos y Gerencia Política de la UPD/OAS a petición 
de la Real Embajada de Noruega’. (13 de mayo 2003). 
• PNUD-IMD: Programa de diálogo multipartidario: 
Evaluaciones de los talleres de diálogo. Agosto 2002-Julio 
2003. 
• Report Management Committee UNDP/IMD on the Dialogue 
programme. Guatemala, 7 april 2003. 
• Auto-evaluación representantes partidos políticos; diálogo 
multipartidaria (31 de julio 2003). 
 
Other documents: 
• Marco lógico: programa para Guatemala del IMD para la 
democracia multipartidaria. Guatemala: ASIES. (June 2003). 
• Memos by IMD Board members on Guatemala. 
• Internal reports by the Guatemala IMD representative. 
• Correspondence at the IMD Headquarters in The Hague. 
• IMD website: www.IMD.org. 
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